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THE NUMBERS MATTER: AN UPDATE 
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW 





To combat the rise of “Prison-Based Gerrymandering”, the New York State Assembly enacted a law 
requiring prisoners to be counted in their “home” districts. These laws changed the Census Bureau’s 
“usual residence rule”, which required the Bureau to count prisoners in their places of incarceration. 
While the law has been a firm step forward to combat prison gerrymandering, the law excludes from 
reapportionment prisoners who cannot provide a known address. This Note argues that New York has 
provided no legal justification for excluding prisoners from reapportionment, especially given the fact that 
there are many in similar situations who are counted. The Note also proposes some solutions to make 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In 2011, New York and Maryland passed reapportionment laws requiring prisoners to be 
counted in their “home” districts rather than their place of incarceration.1 Designed to end prison-based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Act of Aug. 11, 2010, Part XX, 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 57 (McKinney) (bill number S. 6610-C, 233d 
Legislative Session); No Representation Without Population Act. S.B. 400, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010). 
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gerrymandering,2 the laws deviated from the Census Bureau’s policy of the “usual residence rule,” which 
dictated that the Bureau must count prisoners in the places where they are incarcerated. Maryland in 
particular received great praise for its new law, even after enduring legal challenges from the legislators 
who lost a large part of their constituency from the reform.3 
 Nonetheless, as with most laws, prison gerrymandering reforms have faced numerous 
implementation problems. News stories have highlighted the difficulty prison administrators have had 
with tracing the home addresses of some prisoners.4 Some prisoners in one state’s prison system were 
residents of another state. Other prisoners provided addresses that, when checked, were found to be 
incomplete.5 Finally, hundreds of prisoners were homeless when they were arrested and thus had no 
addresses to provide.  
New York and Maryland addressed this problem in different ways. For those prisoners who 
cannot provide a traceable address, Maryland’s “No Representation Without Population” law counts 
those prisoners in the district in which they are incarcerated. On the other hand, New York’s prison 
gerrymandering reform, Part XX, approaches this issue as follows: 
For all incarcerated persons whose residential address prior to incarceration was 
outside of the state, or for whom the task force cannot identify their prior residential 
address, and for all persons confined in a federal correctional facility on census day, 
the task force shall consider those persons to have been counted at an address 
unknown and persons at such unknown address shall not be included in such data set 
created pursuant to this paragraph.6 
 Hence, prisoners without a traceable New York address are not counted for purposes of 
redistricting. While this may make sense in order to stop the issue of prison gerrymandering, New York 
has weak political justifications for excluding prisoners from the redistricting count given the fact that 
there are people who are similarly situated but are included in reapportionment.  
Hence, this Note will address three questions. First, what was the problem Maryland and New 
York were trying to fix in the first place? Second, does New York have a valid reason for not counting 
these prisoners so that it can avoid an Equal Protection violation? Finally, if New York has not done 
enough, what else, if anything, can New York do in order to provide a model solution for other states?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gerrymandering is the manipulation of election districts in order to give political advantages to a particular 
group (including a political party, race, or other social class). Usually this involves two maneuvers. First, gerrymandering 
involves creating districts so that the favored group will have electoral majorities in as many districts as possible. Second, 
it may involve concentrating the opponent’s voting strength to as few districts as possible. The article below will explain 
how gerrymandering applies in the prison context.  
3 See, e.g. Peter Wagner, Beginning of the End for “Prison-Based Gerrymandering,” WASH. POST (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/beginning-of-the-end-for-prison-based-gerrymandering/2012/07/13/ 
gJQAJP7fiW_story.html; Supreme Court Uphold Maryland Law Ending Prison-Based Gerrymandering; Huge Victory for Fair 
Representation, DEMOS (June 25, 2012), http://www.demos.org/press-release/supreme-court-upholds-maryland-law-
ending-prison-based-gerrymandering-huge-victory-fai; Tricia Bishop, High Court Affirms Maryland’s Redistricting Map., THE 
BALTIMORE SUN (June 25, 2012), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-redistricting-plan-
affirmed-20120625,0,5168003.story. 
4 Joseph Spector, About 20,000 Prisoners May Go Uncounted in Redistricting, POLITICS ON THE HUDSON, (Nov. 18, 
2011, 4:20 PM), http://polhudson.lohudblogs.com/2011/11/18/about-20000-prisoners-may-go-uncounted-in-redistrict 
ing/.  
5 “Incomplete” refers to an address that, when traced, leads to a resident being unrelated to the prisoner or to 
an abandoned or non-existent building. 
6  N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m (McKinney 2011). 
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 This Note will begin by assessing Equal Protection jurisprudence and the rise of the “one person, 
one vote” standard. This standard is not only crucial toward understanding why New York and Maryland 
passed prisoner gerrymandering reform in the first place, but also key to understanding the deficiencies 
in New York’s implementation of the law. Next, this Note explains how prison gerrymandering became 
such a problem. The Note then analyzes New York’s prison gerrymandering reform, and argues that 
there is an Equal Protection violation by not counting traceable prisoners. Finally, the Note concludes 
that New York should follow Maryland’s example and count those prisoners without a traceable New 
York address. In fact, this Note asserts that Maryland’s implementation of its prison gerrymandering 
reform can be a model other states can adopt to stop prison gerrymandering while at the same time 
fulfill the major purpose of “one person, one vote”: to make sure that every person that can be counted 
is counted. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Reapportionment and the Rise of “One Person, One Vote”  
1.  Districting Before Baker  v .  Carr  & “One Person, One Vote” 
Every year, Americans fill out their census forms, leading to many consequences not only for 
themselves, but also for those around them. For example, federal, state, and local governments use 
census data for a variety of reasons, including citywide planning,7 verification for government benefits, 
and the distribution of “over $400 billion in federal funds to local, state, and tribal governments each 
year”. 8 Most importantly, the Constitution requires a national census for the purposes of 
reapportionment.9 In this reapportionment process, many districts are created, erased, and combined to 
form new districts reflecting the changes in the state’s population.  
However, until the 1960s, the districting system was wrought with many problems. First, there 
were large discrepancies between different districts. This was a problem not only for the districts drawn 
for the House of Representatives, but also for state and local legislatures.10 The first reason for this 
problem was the role of state power in redistricting, and the perverse incentives it created. Taking 
advantage of the Constitution’s few requirements for redistricting, many states, through their own 
constitutions, placed the power of redistricting to their legislatures, the same body that was benefitting 
from this severe malapportionment.11 Before “one person, one vote,” hundreds of Congressmen and 
state legislators benefitted from gross malapportionment between districts.  
Judicial deference was the second cause leading to gross malapportionment pre-Baker. The prime 
example of this was the Court’s decision in Colegrove v. Green.12 In Colegrove, three Illinois voters challenged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 About Us, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last updated Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.census.gov/aboutus. 
8 Id.  
9 See U.S. CONST.  art. I, §2. 
10 Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that “[the] “representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,” however, it does not specify how they 
should be apportioned. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Moreover, it was unknown if Article I, Section 2 or the Fourteenth 
Amendment, (which basically repeats the language of Article I, Section 2), even applied to the states since the section 
only addresses redistricting for the House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
11 Recently states have started to grant full or partial authority in redistricting to non-partisan commissions. The 
power these commissions have vary from state to state. As of 2011, only Washington, New Jersey, Montana, Idaho, 
Hawaii, and Arizona use commissions to draw both congressional and state legislative districts. See. NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 (2009), available at http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/lg/PDF/ 
NCSL%20Redistrictiing%202010.pdf. 
12 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
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the state’s redistricting plan arguing that the plan was suspect—it was based on a forty-six year old 
census. Thus, “the Federal Census of 1910, of 1920, of 1930, and of 1940, each showed…a substantial 
shift in the distribution of population among the districts established in 1901.”13 The Court even 
acknowledged the legislators’ interest in the status quo by noting that, “the issues of state and 
Congressional apportionment are thus so interdependent that it is to the interest of the State Legislators 
to perpetuate the inequitable apportionment of both State and Congressional election districts.”14 
Nonetheless, the Court upheld the lower court’s dismissal. Noting famously that, “courts ought 
not to enter this political thicket,”15 the Court based its ruling on a lack of a judicial remedy. The opinion 
notes: 
[a]t best, we could only declare that existing electoral system invalid. The result would be 
to leave Illinois undistricted and to bring into operation, if the Illinois legislature chose 
not to act, the choice of members for the House of Representatives on a statewide ticket. 
That last stage may be worse than the first.  The upshot of judicial action may defeat the 
vital political principle which led Congress, more than one hundred years ago, to require 
redistricting. 16 
Thus, the Court did see that malapportionment was a problem. However, the Court decided that issues 
in districting were not justiciable. Instead, the Court noted that Article I, Section 4 of the “Constitution 
has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the State in the popular 
House…If Congress failed in exercising its powers…the remedy ultimately lies with the people.”17 
2.  Baker  v .  Carr  and “One Person, One Vote” 
Much would change in the fourteen years between Colegrove and the Court’s holding in Baker v. 
Carr.18 The Warren Court was now in its eighth year and with a much different membership. In fact, only 
three justices remained from the Colegrove decision, and two of those three (Justices Black and Douglass) 
dissented in Colegrove. 19  Hence, with the hundreds of legislators still benefitting from gross 
malapportionment in Congressional and state legislative districts, the Warren Court decided to 
reconsider the problem of population irregularities.  
The facts in Baker are almost identical to Colegrove. Baker involved a challenge to Tennessee’s 
redistricting scheme, which (due to the failure of the legislature in passing a new districting plan) used the 
1901 census count for the apportionment of the state legislature in 1960.20 Consequently, 
Moore County ha[d] a total representation of two with a population (2,340) of only one-
eleventh of Rutherford County (25, 316) with the same representation…likewise, 
Loudon County (13,264), Houston (3,084), and Anderson County (33,990) have the 
same representation, i.e. 1.25 each.21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Id. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 556.  
16 Id. at 553.  
17 Id. at 554.  
18 Id. at 549; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
19 Justice Frankfurter (who would go on to write the dissent in Baker) was the only justice on the Warren Court 
in the Colegrove majority.  
20 Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
21 Id. at 255 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).  
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But rather than adhering to Colgrove, the Court decided to go in a different direction, holding that 
redistricting problems could be solved through a judicial remedy. The Court noted that ”judicial 
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to 
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine . . . that a discrimination reflects 
no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.”22 
However, while Baker was the beginning of the “one person, one vote” idea, it did not provide 
any standard for states to implement. The Court’s progressive holding in Baker was clouded by its silence 
on how states could avoid equal protection violations during redistricting. Hence, two years later, the 
Court had to go back and establish a judicial standard for the malapportionment problem. For 
Congressional districting, the Court held in Wesberry v. Sanders that each Congressional district must have 
roughly equal populations.23 Thus Baker and Wesberry drastically changed the way states implemented 
their Congressional redistricting plans. In fact, within nine months of Baker, litigation was underway in 
thirty-four states challenging the constitutionality of state redistricting schemes.24 But the Baker/Wesberry 
holdings only provided a judicial remedy for congressional redistricting. The question was still open as to 
whether Baker applied to the drawing of state and local legislatures. Moreover, if Baker did apply to state 
legislative redistricting, could there be any deviations from the standard since redistricting for state 
legislatures involves more variables than congressional redistricting?25 
3.  Reyno lds ,  Karcher ,  and Gaf fney : “One Person, One Vote” to the States 
 While Baker forever changed the way states drew their Congressional districts, districting for 
state and local legislatures was also rife with severe malapportionment. To take an example, the state of 
Tennessee failed to redraw its state legislative districts according to recent federal census data. This 
failure in redrawing led to some single urban districts having as many as ten times more residents than 
single rural districts.26 In Georgia,  
[o]ne unit vote in [the more rural] Echols County represented 938 residents, whereas one 
unit vote in Fulton County [in which Atlanta is located] represented 92,721 residents. 
Thus, one resident in Echols County had an influence in the nomination of candidates 
equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton County.27 
 
Around the same time, the Connecticut state legislature reported single districts ranging from 
191 people to 81,000 people.28 In California, Los Angeles (which at the time had six million people) had 
only one representative in the California State Senate. Meanwhile, the 14,000 people of a rural county 
also had one state senator.29 Finally in Idaho, the smallest Senate district contained 951 people. The 
largest district contained 93,400 people, or ninety-eight times more than the smallest district.30 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Id. at 226. 
23 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).  
24 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 146 
(4th ed. 2007) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 556 (1964)).  
25 These variables could include, for example, “political subdivision” requirements found in state constitutions, 
which require that county subdivisions remain intact during the redistricting process.  
26 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 371 (1963). 
27 Id. 
28 Morris K. Udall, Congressman’s Report: “One Man, One Vote”…That’s All She Wrote!, http://www.library.arizona. 
edu/exhibits/udall/congrept/88th/641014.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). 
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
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Hence, in August 1964, voters of Jefferson County, Alabama challenged the apportionment of 
the Alabama State Legislature. As in many areas of the country, Alabama’s legislature was greatly 
distorted. Though the Alabama Constitution required that the legislature be apportioned every ten years, 
the apportionment of the legislature was still based on the federal census of 1900.31 In the sixty years 
since, population changes in the state made it so that some districts had as many as fourteen times as 
many people as other districts.  
Finding that the malapportionment undervalues individuals’ voting power in certain districts, the 
Court applied Baker and held that “one person, one vote” does apply to redistricting in state legislatures.  
At the same time, the Court did acknowledge the difference between congressional redistricting and state 
redistricting. The Court held that “states can rationally consider factors other than population in 
apportioning legislative representation.”32 Noting that state legislatures tend to have more seats to be 
distributed, the Court acknowledged the importance of certain state goals in the redistricting process. 
This leeway that the Court provided for state goals gives states the authority to consider the importance 
of things such as keeping political subdivision lines and maintaining the compactness and contiguity of 
certain districts when formulating the state-districting scheme.33 Thus, “the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its 
legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”34  
The court would expand on these important state goals in Gaffney v. Cummings35 and Karcher v. 
Daggett.36 In Gaffney, the Court heard a challenge to a Connecticut redistricting plan. The issue with the 
plan was that it was the result of a bipartisan gerrymander that considered the geographic strengths and 
weaknesses of both parties. 37 Moreover, compared to the districts drawn for the House of 
Representatives, the state legislative districts had substantial deviations. 38  Nonetheless, the court 
approved the plan under the Reynolds rationale, noting, “that there are fundamental differences between 
congressional districting under Art. I and the Wesberry line of cases on the one hand, and on the other, 
state legislative reapportionment governed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Reynolds v. Sims and its 
progeny.”39  Hence, Gaffney reaffirmed the Reynolds holding by providing states some flexibility in 
complying with the Baker standard.  
In Karcher, the New Jersey Legislature adopted the “Feldman Plan,” a redistricting plan that had 
only a less than one percent population difference between the largest and smallest districts. Defenders of 
the plan argued that it was a good faith effort to fulfill the “one person, one vote” standard since the 
population deviation between the largest and smallest districts was smaller than the available census data 
for the state. What made the Feldman Plan constitutionally suspect, however, was that the legislature 
considered other plans with much smaller population deviations between the largest and smallest 
districts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 540 (1964). 
32 Id. at 566. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 577.  
35 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
36 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
37  Bipartisan gerrymandering adds a different flavor to political gerrymandering. Rather than one party 
gerrymandering the other out of office, the main political parties strike a deal to keep each other’s incumbents protected.  
38 Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 750. Compared to the districts drawn for the House complying under the Wesberry rule, 
the state senate deviation was 1.81%. For the state assembly (the lower house)),) it was 7.83 percent. Id. 
39 Id. at 742. 
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Unlike Gaffney, the Court struck down the plan. The holding noted that New Jersey could have 
achieved greater population equality “merely by shifting a handful of municipalities from one district to 
another.”40 Moreover, the Court held that the state did not reach its burden of showing that the 
population variances were necessary. The Court did reiterate possible justifications for population 
variances such as keeping “districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of 
prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives,”41 but it noted that “the State 
must . . . show with some specificity that a particular objective required the specific deviations in its place, 
rather than simply relying on general assertions.”42 
 Thus, in summary, Baker and its progeny held that redistricting for congressional districts would 
be held to a higher level of scrutiny than the redistricting of the state legislatures.43 Districts drawn for 
state legislatures can deviate from the “one person, one vote” standard if they achieve certain state 
interests such as keeping districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, or avoiding contests 
between incumbent legislatures.44 While the states have this greater leeway, they must prove that there 
was a particular objective that required a deviation from “one person, one vote” in the first place.45 
The “one person, one vote” cases drastically altered the redistricting process for Congress and 
state legislatures. Yet, while these holdings had many effects on the process of reapportionment, the means 
through which people are counted for redistricting have not really changed. To this day, the census 
counts most people in the district in which they reside, and in general this approach has been mostly 
effective in attaching everyday citizens to their districts.  
For prisoners, however, the method through which they are counted has led to three questions.  
Primarily, where should prisoners be counted? Secondly, where does the method of counting prisoners 
intersect with the racial disparities in the criminal justice system? Finally, what are the effects of counting 
these prisoners in a certain place?  
B.  Issues with the Census Bureau’s Counting of Prisoners 
1. Counting Prisoners 
 As stated above, states rely on Census Bureau data when they go through the redistricting 
process. The Bureau counts most individuals based on the “residence rule,” which counts the person in, 
“the place where a person lives and sleeps most of the time.”46 As applied to certain groups, the Bureau 
classifies certain living arrangements such as prisons, military barracks, and dormitories as “group 
quarters” for the usual residency requirement.47 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 739. 
41 Id. at 740.  
42 Id. at 741. The Court seemed to have provided much deference to what a “specific justification”is. The Court 
explains that “the showing required to justify population deviations is flexible, depending on the size of the deviation, 
the importance of the state’s interests, the consistency with which the plan as a whole reflects those interests, and the 
availability of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those interests yet approximate population equality more 
closely.” Id.  
43 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
44 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
45 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
46 Residence Rule and Residence Situations for the 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ 
population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/ resid_rules.html. (last visited Apr 21, 2014).  
47 2010 American Community Survey/Puerto Rico Community Survey Group Quarters Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/data_documentation/GroupDefinitions/2010GQ_ 	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To the states that are redistricting, this “group quarters” classification brings up many issues of 
representation. First, there are many prisoners who consider their place of residence as somewhere 
different from where they have been incarcerated. Second, the Census Bureau’s records do not 
distinguish who is a “group quarter” resident from who is not. Moreover, much of the group quarters 
data was not given to states until very recently.48 
2.  Prisoner Counting and Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System 
 Though deciding how to count prisoners is already a difficult issue, it becomes an even more 
complex problem due to the racial disparities in the criminal justice system. Blacks make up 41.3% of the 
federal and state prison population.49 In 2012 in the state of New York, the general population was 
71.2% white, but approximately seventy-seven percent of its prison population was either Black or 
Latino.50 In Georgia, Blacks make up about thirty percent of the general population but over sixty 
percent of the prison population.  
While there are a number of causes for the racial disparity in the prison population, one of the 
main causes has been the implementation of the War on Drugs. In the United States, drug offenders 
comprise almost half of America’s federal prison capacity.51 However, the mass incarceration of drug 
offenders has a racial aspect. Though statistics show that drug usage is about the same across racial lines, 
Blacks make up a large proportion of those imprisoned for drug offenses. 52  Moreover, due to 
overcrowded prisons, the rapid increase of drug offenders in prison has necessitated the release of more 
violent offenders, such as those convicted of murder.53 As this Note explains further below, race 
disparities in the prison system are important in the prison-gerrymandering context since they produce a 
race-based voting disparity problem. Since most of the prisoners are Black and Latino, not counting 
these constituents in their home districts (or at all) could potentially take away a substantial amount of 
voting power from certain districts with large Black and Latino voting strength.   
3.  Prisoner Vote Dilution and Prison-Based Gerrymandering 
 As stated above, only New York, Maryland, and Delaware have passed laws to stop counting 
prisoners in the districts in which they are incarcerated. Thus, for states that still accept the usual 
residence rule, there remain even more issues. Most importantly, counting prisoners using the usual 
residence rule transfers political power from urban communities of color to rural white communities.54  
This problem exists because most prisons are located in rural areas. Rural communities make up 20% of 
the US population, but these communities are home to 60% of new prison construction.55 To take a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Definitions.pdf. 
48 In this current redistricting cycle, the census bureau will release its “group quarter” data to the states. 
However, it is far too early to decide if this will ameliorate the problem. 
49 See Prison Based Gerrymandering Legislative Reform, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.naacpldf. 
org/case/prison-based-gerrymandering. 
50 State and County Quick Facts for New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
36000.html (last visited April 20, 2014). 
51 Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743, 751 
(1993). 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, CAPTIVE CONSTITUENTS: PRISON-BASED 
GERRYMANDERING & THE DISTORTION OF OUR DEMOCRACY 4-5 (2010), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/ 
files/publications/Captive%20Constituents%20Report.pdf. 
55 Peter Wagner, Importing Constituents: Prisoners and Political Clout in New York, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/ importing/importing.html/. 
      An Update to the Implementation of New York’s Prison Gerrymandering Law Vol. 4:2	  214	  
local example, only 24% of New York’s prisoners are from upstate New York, yet about 91% of the 
state’s prisoners are incarcerated there.56 66% of New York’s prisoners are from New York City, 
meaning that numerous prisoners from the city are being sent to rural locations upstate.57 
 Second, distortions arising from prison-based gerrymandering can lead to extreme disparities 
between the number of people counted and the number of people who can actually vote in the district.  
The most infamous example of this came in Anamosa, Iowa. There the town was divided into four 
wards for elections to its city council. However, while each ward contained approximately 1370 people 
(thus fulfilling the one person, one vote standard), Ward 3 contained a penitentiary that housed over 
1320 prisoners. Thus if one removes the prison population from Ward 3, there were fewer than 50 
people in the district.58 This is especially problematic when state legislatures take race into account 
during redistricting. For example, District 1 in Somerset County, Maryland, was drawn as a majority-
minority district in order to remedy a Voting Rights Act violation in the 1980’s.59,60 However, since the 
prisoners of the Eastern Correctional Institute (who were overwhelmingly Black and Latino) were 
counted for redistricting, only a few blacks who lived in District 1 were actually eligible to vote. Thus, a 
district that may have been created to elect a minority candidate to the legislature ended up not electing a 
Black candidate until 2010.61 
 Finally, distortions based on using the usual residency rule also provide legislators a disincentive 
toward prison reform. Dale Ho notes that “because their political power depends in some measure on a 
continuing influx of prisoners, legislators from prison districts have a strong incentive to oppose criminal 
justice reforms that might decrease incarceration rates.”62 Prison reformer, Peter Wagner, also noted this 
issue when talking about New York’s districting system before its prison-based gerrymandering reforms.  
Seven New York state senate districts drawn after the 2000 Census met minimum 
population requirements only because they use prison populations as padding.63 Of the 
seven New York senate districts discussed above, four of the senators sat on the 
powerful Codes Committee where they opposed reforming the state’s draconian 
Rockefeller drug law that boosted the state’s prison population. 64  The inflated 
populations of these senators’ districts gave them little incentive to consider or pursue 
policies that might reduce the numbers of people sent to prison or the length of time 
they spend there. One of them, Republican New York state Senator Dale Volker, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58  NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, Testimony of Dale Ho (2011), available at 
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/Dale%20Ho%20 Testimony%20Kentucky.pdf. Furthermore, the number of 
voters in Ward 3 may have been even fewer, since the Census counts many people who are not voting age (such as 
children or prisoners).  
59 Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, (D. Md. 2011). 
60 The reasons legislatures draw majority-minority districts are manifold. Optimists say that these districts aid in 
the election of either a minority member to the legislature or a white candidate who is amenable to the views of the 
minorities. Pessimists would say that these districts are a way to dilute the voting power of minorities. 
 
61 Fletcher, 831 F.Supp.2d at 887.  
62 Dale Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 355, 363-64  (2011).  
63 Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 
1243 (2012). 
64 Id. at 1244. 
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boasted that he was glad that the almost 9,000 people confined in his district cannot vote 
because “they would never vote for me.”65 
 Hence, the rise of prison-based gerrymandering has undermined the purpose of “one person, 
one vote.” While these gerrymandered districts are numerically equivalent to the other districts in their 
state, many of these districts only exist due to their prison populations. Finally, prison-based 
gerrymandering leads to many issues that are extrinsic to voting power itself, since it may contribute 
towards sustaining mass incarceration.  
III.  ARGUMENT 
 This section argues that while these reforms have been a step forward toward ending the 
problems associated with prison-based gerrymandering, New York violated the Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause by refusing to count prisoners to whom the state could not attach an address. This 
section of the Note addresses what New York and Maryland have done to solve the problem. Second, 
this section analyzes potential justifications that New York may proffer in order to defeat an equal 
protection claim. Finally, this section explores ways toward perfecting New York’s system so that the 
purpose of “one person, one vote” can be fulfilled.  
A. The Problems of the Census Process in Counting Prisoners  
In 2011, New York and Maryland passed legislation changing where prisoners are counted for 
reapportionment.66 As of November 2012, approximately twenty states have either introduced legislation 
abolishing prison-based gerrymandering or are considering resolutions that would ask the Census Bureau 
to change where incarcerated people are counted.67 The solution to combat prison-based gerrymandering 
that New York and Maryland decided upon was to count prisoners in their home districts rather than the 
districts in which they have been incarcerated. These states still accept the data from the Census Bureau 
for counting most of the population. However, to achieve the objective of their prison-based 
gerrymandering reforms, the states obtain different sets of data for their prisoners. The states receive this 
data from their Departments of Corrections and create a database with the pre-incarceration addresses of 
every prisoner. While these changes were easy to implement for a majority of prisoners, the law has not 
been without problems.  
1. Prisoners Without Addresses 
The largest issue that arises from anti-prison gerrymandering laws is that there are many 
prisoners who could not be traced back to a home district. This is especially a problem for the hundreds 
of prisoners who are homeless. Homelessness is a leading catalyst for incarceration due to a number of 
local laws prohibiting sleeping, standing, and panhandling in public areas. Moreover, a homeless person 
being imprisoned leads to a vicious cycle. Past imprisonment tends to lead to more homelessness, since 
released prisoners usually do not have a home to return to. Moreover, released prisoners usually face 
many difficulties securing new housing. For example, many states either must or have the discretion to 
exclude former convicts from all public housing. This is turn leaves them homeless, and thus more likely 
to be arrested and imprisoned again under a variety of local laws.  Are there citations these statements? If 
not it’s fine because it’s so late but it would be good to have citations for these statements. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Id.  
66 Delaware also passed an anti-prison gerrymandering law in 2011. However, this Note will focus on the 
responses from New York and Maryland.  
67 Peter Wagner, Momentum is Building to End Prison-Based Gerrymandering, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, http:// 
www.prisonpolicy.org/atlas/momentum.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
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Further, outside of the homeless, there are still many problems with addresses. Hundreds of 
prisoners are incarcerated in states in which they do not live. Moreover, if a prisoner does provide an 
address, there is a chance that someone else may be living at that address.  
The data in Maryland underscore this point. In a court challenge against Maryland’s “No 
Representation Without Population” Act, the director of Maryland’s prisoner reallocation adjustment 
program noted that of the 22,064 prisoners under Maryland’s Division of Corrections, 111 had 
incomplete addresses, 1,321 had addresses that were out of state, and 1,635 either had no addresses or 
were homeless when incarcerated.68 These prisoners were eventually counted in the district in which they 
were incarcerated.  
New York’s prison-based gerrymandering reform, however, treats those prisoners without 
addresses differently. The New York State Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and 
Reapportionment (LATFOR) stipulates that “in the event the inmates’ prior residential addresses are 
unknown…[or] were outside the state…LATFOR ‘shall consider those persons to have been counted at 
an address unknown and persons at such unknown address shall not be included in such data set’ to be 
used to draw legislative districts.”69 As of the 2010 redistricting, 46,003 of the 58,237 state prisoners were 
successfully traced back to a home address. Thus, 12,234 prisoners (or just over 21% of the total number 
of state prisoners) had no traceable address. Unlike Maryland’s procedure of just counting the prisoners 
in the places where they are incarcerated, New York’s Part XX removes these prisoners from the 
counting process altogether. 
2. Problems with Federal Prisoners  
Another problem with implementing prison-based gerrymandering reform is that it requires 
cooperation between state and federal government. In Maryland, there has been minimal cooperation.  
The state filed a Freedom of Information Act request to the Federal Bureau of Prisons for information 
on the home addresses of federal prisoners. However, the Bureau rejected the request, forcing Maryland 
to exclude approximately 1,500 prisoners from its Division of Correction database.70 Similarly, New 
York’s Part XX also requires LATFOR to not count federal prisoners. In New York’s redistricting plan, 
2,471 federal prisoners were not counted.71,72 Hence, due to a failure in federal and state government 
cooperation, hundreds of prisoners, some of whom can most likely be traced to a home address, will be 
excluded from redistricting count.  
B. Lit t l e  v .  LATFOR : The New York Courts Approve Part XX 
In 2011, a group of state senators from New York challenged Part XX. However, rather than 
basing their argument on the Equal Protection Clause, the group of senators declared, “Part XX violates 
Article III, §4 of the state constitution because the method of counting inmates in their prior residences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Fletcher v. Lamone. (Civil Action No: 8:11-cv-03220-RWT); Declaration of James Cannistra, Head of Maryland’s 
Redistricting Project, available at http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/fletcher/AG_exhibit_2.pdf (last visited: Jan 22, 
2014).  
69 Little v. N. Y. State Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment, available at  
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/little/Decision_and_Order.pdf 
70 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at n.3.  
71 The reasons behind this are not totally clear. It is possible, however, that the Federal Bureau of Prisons also 
refused New York’s request for the addresses of the federal prisoners residing in its five facilities.  
72 See Read Me File for 2010 Redistricting Data, available at http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/data/?sec=2010amend 
pop (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).  
2014           COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW	   	  217 
rather than their place of incarceration deviated from that recommended by the Census Bureau in 
2006.”73 
New York’s Supreme Court upheld the law and refuted many of the senators’ arguments. First, 
the Court found that the senators did not demonstrate that Part XX made “the data provided by the 
Census Bureau to be anything less than “controlling” in the redistricting process.”74 Second, the senators 
argued that “[excluding the] inmates whose addresses cannot be determined or are from outside the state 
contravene that part of Article III that require all “inhabitants” be counted for apportionment 
purposes.”75 The Court found this unavailing. The Court argued that while “[the] inmates may be 
physically found in the locations of their respective facilities, . . . there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that such inmates have any actual permanency in the location or have an intent to remain.”76 Moreover, 
“[the] plaintiffs have not proffered evidence that inmates have substantial ties to the communities in 
which they are involuntarily and temporarily located.”77   
These statements from the Court are not unwarranted. The state senators’ complaint offered no 
justifications as to why prisoners without a New York address should have been counted beyond a 
reading of the legal text, which said:   
Part XX also bars enumeration of persons found in the state . . . whose prior addresses 
cannot be identified because of missing information. The Federal Census found them 
present in the state for the purpose of being enumerated, and thus they should be 
counted by the explicit terms of Article III §4, yet Part XX edits the census numbers to 
exclude them. The editing of the census to add or subtract inhabitants violates the 
explicit constitutional provision that the Federal Decennial Census “shall be controlling” 
and cannot be harmonized in the face of a direct constitutional command.78 
Hence, the plaintiffs failed to introduce any arguments for why those prisoners without a traceable New 
York address should be counted. This Note will present these potential arguments below.  
C. Legal Issues With New York’s Gerrymandering Law 
As stated above, equal protection jurisprudence gives states more flexibility to deviate from the 
“one person, one vote” standard when drawing state legislative districts, given that the state provides a 
valid political reason to deviate from population equality. This gives the state the ability to pay more 
respect to the compactness and contiguity of political subdivisions that have greater importance in local 
elections than congressional elections, among other considerations.79 Thus, the key issue in a potential 
suit against LATFOR would be whether the state could provide a valid reason for not counting prisoners 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Little, supra note 69, at 5; Article 3, §4 of the New York Constitution says that the federal census “shall be 
controlling to as to the numbers of inhabitants in the state or any part thereof for the purposes of the apportionment of 
members and assembly and readjustment or alteration of senate and assembly districts nest occurring, in so far as such 
census and the tabulation thereof purport to give the information necessary therefor.” 
74 Little, supra note 69, at 7.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Compl. Little v. LATFOR, (Index No. 2310-2011) (2012), available at http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/ 
little/complaint.pdf. 
79 States may also have to respect issues such as political boundaries (e.g. city, state and county lines), social, 
racial, and ethnic communities and making sure party considerations do not dominate the districting plan. All of these 
other state guidelines are usually dictated by the state’s constitution.  
      An Update to the Implementation of New York’s Prison Gerrymandering Law Vol. 4:2	  218	  
without addresses. However, as New York’s Supreme Court noted in Little, those challenging Part XX 
will have to provide “evidence that inmates have substantial ties to the communities in which they are 
involuntarily and temporarily located.”80 Without this evidence, it is likely that the Court would lean 
toward approving New York’s plan. Thus the point of this section is to demonstrate that while these 
prisoners are not as integrated into the communities where their prisons are located, they are not so 
detached from the community that the state should refuse to count them at all.  
1. What Reasons Could New York Proffer for Not Counting Prisoners Who 
Are Homeless or Had Incomplete Addresses?  
 Even though they are barred from voting, New York prisoners without home addresses are not 
counted for the purposes of redistricting. This seems like a peculiar step for the state for two reasons.  
First, many localities have decided to count the homeless and transient in their population censuses.  
This makes New York’s decision not to count these prisoners questionable since prisoners who have no 
home address are not transient. They remain in the same known place for the duration of their sentence. 
Moreover, while these prisoners may not claim the prison as their domicile, the fact that these prisoners 
receive some benefit from the area in which they live suggests that the state should not exclude them 
from the districting process.   Second, the other major state to pass an anti-prison gerrymandering law, 
Maryland, did decide to count those prisoners without addresses in the places where they are 
incarcerated. If Maryland counts these prisoners in their imprisoned districts, what political reasons does 
New York have to not count these prisoners at all?  
a. The Non-Voter Argument 
 One political reason defenders of the law may bring up is that counting prisoners without 
addresses in their prison districts would ruin the purpose behind its prison gerrymandering reform. Thus, 
since prisoners cannot vote, the purpose of the anti-prison gerrymandering law outweighs the necessity 
of counting these prisoners in their first place.  
 While it is true that New York does not allow prisoners to vote, it is not a valid political reason 
to exclude them from the count completely. In fact, many groups who are not incarcerated, “such as 
minors, unregistered voters, or non-incarcerated felons (who are eligible to vote in some states, even 
after the completion of a sentence) … are counted where they are physically located for redistricting 
purposes.”81 Thus, the central question is whether a state could use “voting population” as the standard 
for redistricting if total population could lead to voting disparities. If the state can use voting populations 
as a means of redistricting, then New York has every right to not count those prisoners without 
addresses.  
 While the Supreme Court has not decided on this question, lower courts have denied numerous 
challenges to districting plans that counted non-voters. A prime example comes from a Washington D.C. 
district court in Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick. In that case, the organization 
challenged the Census Bureau’s counting of undocumented immigrants who were later included in a data 
file that was used for a redistricting plan. Though the court dismissed the case for lack of standing, the 
court did note in dicta:  
We also note that the phrase itself is inaccurate shorthand for the concept of equal 
representation for equal numbers of people, insofar as it is possible. State districts drawn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Little, supra note 69, at 7. 
81 Ho, supra note 62, at 364. 
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strictly on the basis of population would clearly be constitutional, . . . in spite of the fact 
that concentrations of non-voting residents in a few district’s (such as where prisons or 
orphanages are located) would make the ballots of voters in a few districts more 
“valuable” than voters’ ballots in other districts.82 
 Hence, while the Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue, lower federal courts have 
protected the identity of undocumented immigrants with regard to being counted in the census. If New 
York assumes that it can exclude prisoners from being counted because they cannot vote, Klutznick 
strongly suggests that this argument would not be a valid political motivation.  
b. The “Lack of Integration” Argument 
 A second argument LATFOR can aver (and the court supported in Little) is that the state does 
not want to undermine its prison gerrymandering reform in order to count prisoners who are not as 
integrated into the community as other non-voting groups, such as college students or even 
undocumented immigrants. LATFOR could argue that prisoners are “physically prohibited from 
integrating into their surrounding communities.”83 Moreover, unlike anyone else who is counted for 
reapportionment, “incarcerated persons have no choice in where they are located.”84 The prisoners tend 
to reside in their prison district temporarily,85 and unlike many people who are counted for the purpose 
of redistricting, prisoners cannot enjoy many of the benefits the state and federal governments provide, 
such as parks, public schools, and highways.  
 However, while these arguments have some merit, it is a stretch to assume that community 
integration is the key factor to being counted. Small children are usually in the house most of the time, 
and yet the Census Bureau requires that parents report them for housing.86 Moreover, thousands of 
people who are under hospice care are also counted for the U.S. Census, yet most of them are physically 
restrained from going out into their surrounding communities.87 Finally thousands of men and women 
who serve in the military are assigned to bases in which they do not choose to go, however, the census 
counts them under the “group residence” rule.  
 Moreover, this argument ignores the vast amount of resources prisoners do use every day. In the 
2010 fiscal year, New York spent a total of 3.6 billion dollars to incarcerate an average daily population 
of 59,327 prisoners. This comes to about 60,076 dollars per inmate.88 
 Thus, while prisoners may not be able to enjoy the same parks, public schools, and roadways as 
the members of their community, they are economically integrated in the community because it is where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 577 n.16.  
83 Ho, supra note 62, at 374. 
84 Id.  
85 Little, supra note 69, at 7. 
86 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 47. 
87 In 2010, 292,759 people were counted under the Hospice Census. This census counts those who remained in 
hospice care at the end of that year. See NAT’L HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE ORG, NHPCO FACTS AND FIGURES: 
HOSPICE CARE IN AMERICA (2011), http://www.nhpco.org/sites/default/files/public/Statistics_Research/2011_ 
Facts_Figures.pdf. 
88 This number takes into account the 2.7 billion dollars that is part of the New York Department of 
Correction’s Budget plus the 812.5 million in prison-related costs that are outside the department’s budget. These 
outside budget costs may include prison-related costs paid by state agencies outside of the Department of Corrections 
and costs related to the paying of benefits (such as health care and pensions) for prison employees.  See VERA 
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS (2012), available at 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf. 
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they consume most of their resources. Much of the $60,076 that each inmate receives goes towards 
medical care, food, hygiene, living facilities, and recreation. Moreover, much like everyone else in the 
community, they use the same licensed medical staff for health services, the same utilities (such as water 
and electricity), and the same roads to get to and from places.89 Thus, similar to everyone else in their 
communities, prisoners live their lives using resources and personal services. And while these services 
may not include access to a community college or a stadium, the community benefits prisoners receive 
are actually much more important than a stadium is to an unincarcerated person.  
c. The Duration/Intent Argument 
 Finally, New York could advance Judge Devine’s argument in the Little opinion that there was 
“nothing in the record to indicate that such inmates have any actual permanency in these locations or 
have intent to remain.”90 This argument makes sense if one looks at prisoners as a single group.  
However, the argument becomes tenuous when one looks at other groups that the Census Bureau 
counts in their districts that are unlikely to reside in those areas long-term. United States military 
personnel, individuals living in military barracks, and individuals incarcerated in disciplinary barracks and 
jails in the United States are counted at their respective facilities.91 College attendees who live away from 
their parents’ homes are counted at their colleges.92 Likewise, foreign students, some of whom most 
likely have visas that expire after their course of study, are also counted on campus.93  
 Hence, when looking at the people who are likely to be temporary residents but are nevertheless 
still counted where they presently reside, the “intent-to-stay” argument is inconsistent. Moreover, an 
argument that posits that these students or military men may end up staying long-term is flawed. First, 
the argument is simply speculative. Military men may be called overseas at any time, and students often 
obtain employment or attend graduate school elsewhere after graduation. The second problem with this 
argument is that, even assuming that some students or military members intend to stay in the areas in 
which they are counted, there are hundreds of prisoners who will have to stay in their areas for a long 
time. As of last year, 61.3% of New York state prisoners are serving minimum sentences beyond forty-
eight months, the usual time it takes to get a bachelor’s degree.94 For all New York state prisoners, the 
average minimum sentence is close to ten years, and the median minimum sentence is approximately five 
years.95 Thus, it would be inconsistent for the State to argue that it cannot count these prisoners because 
they do not intend to stay while simultaneously accepting Census data that counts other temporary 
residents who remain for a shorter period of time.  
 Finally, this argument is not novel. As Dale Ho notes, “the Third Circuit has held that, for the 
purposes of the Census count, there is a reasonable basis for treating [inmates] differently from, for 
instance, temporarily hospitalized individuals, who are allocated to their home addresses.”96 The Court 
held that incarcerated persons, “as distinguished from . . . those temporarily in a hospital for a short 
duration, often have no other fixed place of abode, and the length of their institutional stay is often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Prisoners may have to be transported for multiple reasons such as appearing in court, laboring at a work 
farm, or being released.  
90 Little, supra note 69, at 7.  
91 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 47. 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94  STATE OF NEW YORK DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, UNDER CUSTODY REPORT: PROFILE OF INMATE 
POPULATION UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1, 2011 10 (2011), available at http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/ 
Reports/2011/UnderCustody_Report_2011.pdf. 
95 Id.  
96 Ho, supra note 62, at 372.  
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indefinite.”97 Moreover, while the Supreme Court has not provided a definite holding on the duration 
issue, the Court has noted in dicta there may be a difference between long and short-term displacement.  
 The Court in Franklin v. Massachusetts held that physical presence should not be a determining 
factor in identifying a person’s residence.98 However, the Court in Franklin did note that “those persons 
who are institutionalized in out of state hospitals or jails for short terms are also counted in their home 
states.”99 From this dictum, Ho concludes, “the implication could be that persons incarcerated for 
lengthier sentences are in fact properly enumerated where they are incarcerated.100 
 Thus, upon looking at the three potential “political reasons” for not counting prisoners for the 
purposes of redistricting, it is clear there is some inconsistency. New York counts numerous people who 
are in living situations that are similar to prisoners. And while it is true that students or military members 
are not behind bars, many of these people either tend to stay where they are counted temporarily or were 
placed there by some authority. If New York really wants to look at issues of duration, 
disenfranchisement, and lack of integration with regard to prisoners, the state must also consider the fact 
that it counts a large number of people who have similar issues.  
D. What Should Be Done?  
 This next section details not only what New York can do to make its prisoner gerrymandering 
reform better, but also what the Census Bureau can do to facilitate the prison gerrymandering reforms 
that are gradually permeating throughout the country. Thus, the following section will posit federal and 
state solutions that can create a better model for prisoner gerrymandering reform for other states to 
adopt.  
1. States Should Count Prisoners Who Have No Attributable Home Address in the 
Districts Where They are Incarcerated Unless They Provide Evidence 
Substantiating a Proffered Interest  
 As explained above, states should count any untraceable prisoners in the districts where they are 
incarcerated. While New York’s experience with Part XX envisions prison gerrymandering reform as a 
binary decision (either count them in the districts or not), prison gerrymandering reform comes through 
a variety of plans. In fact, some states have proposed prison gerrymandering reforms that would remove 
all prisoners from the redistricting plan.101  
 Nonetheless, as explained above, these prisoners should be counted for the purposes of 
redistricting mostly on the principle of consistent treatment for those who are similarly situated. As a 
resident from Michigan City noted in response to a proposal excluding prisoners from redistricting,   
. . . if we were to exclude prisoners from a redistricting count on the grounds that they 
cannot vote, we should also exclude people under the age of 18, who also cannot vote. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 582 (1971). 
98 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 789 (1992). 
99 Id.  
100 Ho, supra note 62, at n. 96. 
101 The author believes that these reforms are a worse violation of equal protection assuming that the states are 
able to attribute those prisoners to a traceable address. In fact, these reforms are susceptible to a Section 2 claim under 
the Voting Rights Act (which covers voting dilution). Moreover, if this change involves a covered jurisdiction then these 
reforms could also be open to a Section 5 Voting Rights Act claim, which provides remedies for any changes in a 
covered jurisdiction specified in the Act. 
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Census gives us a block-by-block breakdown of the population under 18 just as it provides data 
on so-called “Advanced Group Quarters” for prisoners. 
 
And what about members of Jehovah’s Witness, whose faith does not permit them to 
vote? Their numbers may be harder to exclude since we’ve not had a religious census since 1970. 
Still, you’d have to be consistent.102 
This lack of consistency with regard to counting prisoners is even more problematic when one takes into 
account the racial disparities of the criminal justice system. Many advocates of prison gerrymandering 
reform have argued that prison gerrymandering “weakens minority voting strength and transfers political 
power from urban communities of color to predominantly white areas.”103 However, this argument also 
cuts the other way: if counting minority prisoners in predominantly white areas is a dilution of voting 
power, then excluding minority prisoners from the process altogether seems to be a more egregious 
dilution. Hence, regarding untraceable prisoners, the issue is not whether the reform could halt the 
dilution itself. Instead, it is a matter of how best to reduce dilution of the voting strength of these prisoners.  
 When it comes to redistricting, prisoners without a traceable address have no home. It would be 
infeasible to count them where they have committed their crimes, where they have been sheltered, or 
where the police find them. The only traceable place to which the state can trace these homeless 
prisoners is their place of incarceration. However, while these prisoners are not as integrated into the 
community as those who are not imprisoned, one should not ignore the variety of resources that 
prisoners use within the community. If physical restraint and lack of integration are the standards that 
decide whether one is counted for redistricting, then states must reexamine those who are similarly 
situated but are counted anyways.   
 2.  The Census Bureau Should Coordinate with the States on a Proper 
Method for Collecting Addresses  
 As of this writing, the Census Bureau still adheres to the usual residency rule when it counts 
prisoners. Proponents of prison gerrymandering reform argue that the Bureau should try to collect the 
pre-incarceration addresses of prisoners and integrate those addresses in the data files that the Bureau 
gives to the states. However, as the trend of prison gerrymandering reform permeates through the 
country, it runs into a potential problem. Prison gerrymandering reforms assume that the states have 
adequate information about prisoners before incarceration. The Census Bureau believes that some states 
may not have this information. According to a Census Bureau’s report in 2006, twenty percent of the 
states either do not keep the pre-incarceration addresses of prisoners or only keep this information in 
paper form.104 
 On the other hand, some contend that the Bureau’s qualms about the states’ lack of information 
may be overstated. The New York City Bar Association analyzed New York’s available prisoner 
addresses. According to the New York City Bar, “the New York Department of Correctional Service 
could compile a list of the home addresses of all inmates who are in state prisons on Census Day, and it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Beryle Burgwald, Some Thoughts on Who to Exclude in Redistricting, The NEWS DISPATCH (Jan. 8, 2013, 5:06 
PM), http://thenewsdispatch.com/articles/2013/01/08/news/opinion/local_guest_editorials/doc50eb83ee855a 
0537877070.txt. 
103 See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 49.  
104 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABULATING PRISONERS AT THEIR “PERMANENT HOME OF RECORD” 
ADDRESS (2006) available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/2006-02-21_tabulating_prisoners.pdf. 
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would be a simple matter—a few hours’ work with readily available software—to determine . . . the 
number of prisoners to be attributed to each census block.”105 
 Regardless of who is right in this debate, the Census Bureau can still ameliorate many issues that 
could arise as more states decide to engage in prison gerrymandering reform. First, it can encourage 
states to submit the pre-incarceration addresses that could later be integrated into the same file that the 
Bureau produces to the states. For those states that say that they do not have this information, there is 
nothing preventing them from obtaining it.  It is not beyond reason for these states to start a plan in 
obtaining these addresses. In fact, these correction departments could possibly coordinate with other 
state agencies to find traceable addresses for a large segment of their prison populations.  
 A second issue that arises pertains to who should have control of the data once the correction 
departments collect them. One possibility is that the Census Bureau should keep the data and integrate 
them into its numeration files that it gives to the states. Another option is that if the states adopt prison 
gerrymandering reform then they should also have the choice to decide what to do with their data.  Many 
issues regarding this question are still unresolved. However, going forward there will likely be much 
litigation over what states can and cannot do with data they collect for redistricting. Many courts have 
held that states do not have to follow the Census Bureau’s data files for their redistricting plans. What 
the state can use, however, remains unknown.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this Note was not only to critique New York’s prison gerrymandering reform, 
but also to provide a model that other states can use for their own reforms to stop prison-based 
distortions. This Note acknowledges that Part XX has been a firm step forward toward fulfilling the 
“one person, one vote” standard set out in Baker. However, not counting prisoners who have no 
traceable addresses is an unjustified treatment to the over 12,000 prisoners removed from New York’s 
redistricting plan. The state can argue that its purpose lies in implementing its prison gerrymandering 
reform, but this argument is tenuous in the face of how it counts others. LATFOR counts others who 
are similarly situated such as undocumented immigrants, students, and military members. Like prisoners, 
many of these people stay in their areas for a short period of time, have no intent on staying where they 
reside, and use the same resources (such as utilities, roads, and government funded facilities) as prisoners.  
Moreover, the common argument about prisoners not being able to vote is inapplicable here, since there 
are numerous groups of people who cannot vote yet are still counted.  
 In sum, it will come down to whether a court believes that New York’s interest in implementing 
Part XX outweighs the counting of over 12,000 prisoners. Baker and its progeny held that population 
equality is a central idea to the Constitution. Yet, at the same time, these cases have given states much 
more leeway to deviate from the standard. The bounds of how much freedom the states have are fairly 
unknown. What we do know is that states cannot deviate from population equality for arbitrary or 
discriminatory reasons, such as a racial group’s voting strength.106 What we also know is that courts have 
accepted certain state interests (such as keeping districts compact, maintaining political subdivisions, and 
avoiding contests between incumbent legislators) as valid reasons to deviate from the Reynolds rule. What 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See NEW YORK CITY BAR, A PROPOSED NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO 
EMANCIPATE REDISTRICTING FROM PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS: PARTISAN CHANNELED FOR FAIR LINE-
DRAWING C-5 (2007), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/redistricting_report03071.pdf. 
106 While powerful voting blocs cannot be excluded from the districting process itself, it can be “packed”, 
“cracked”, or “gerrymandered out” in the districting process. However, the drawing of districts itself is subject to other 
Supreme Court precedent and is not within the scope of this Note.   
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makes this case so novel is that “preventing prison-based distortions” has not been a recognized state 
interest by the Supreme Court. Moreover, even if the Court recognizes this interest, how small does the 
exclusion have to be before the significant interest becomes an insignificant one?  
 Regardless, the meaning behind the “one person, one vote” standard should not be a rubber 
stamp to a stated governmental interest. The standard should require more than that. Instead, “one 
person, one vote” should require close judicial scrutiny not only to a state’s proffered interest, but also to 
how the facts presented support that interest.  
 In this case, New York has provided no evidence supporting the fact that excluding over 12,000 
prisoners from redistricting furthers their interest in implementing Part XX. Some may note that 12,000 
prisoners are a large number, but it is unknown how this number may affect the redistricting process.  
Are these 12,000 prisoners so spread out amongst the prison districts that their effect is negligible? Or 
are enough prisoners concentrated in a certain area that a district may not exist without counting them? 
Only New York knows. Thus, unless there is evidence proving otherwise, New York should follow 
Maryland’s lead and not exclude unassigned prisoners from the vote count. Doing so underscores the 
constitutional guarantee that states will make that “honest and good faith effort” to ensure that every 
person is counted, regardless of where they reside. 
  
 
